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Research on the European Union’s role as a meditator is nascent. It predominantly focuses on case studies 
or is cursorily embedded within wider research on the European Union (EU) as a crisis manager. 
Moreover, there is a significant disconnect between the established studies on mediation based in Conflict 
Analysis Studies and the EU’s foreign and security policy situated in Security Studies. Thus, there is a 
dearth of systematic engagement on the issue of EU mediation, although the EU often uses the language 
of mediation as a key component of its external commitments to conflict prevention, transformation and 
resolution. While advancements in mediation research suggest that there are certain determinants of 
mediation, and highlight key features that support and impede actors during conflict, this has not been 
systematically applied to the EU. Consequently, a key task of this workshop was to establish conceptual 
clarity and practical information about on the EU’s mediation roles. 
As a starting point, this workshop took stock of EU mediation knowledge from the perspective of different 
actors including academics, civil society and policy practitioners. In particular, it explored the limited 
academic engagement with this particular aspect of EU foreign and security policy. Additionally, the 
workshop critically interrogated how the EU understood its role in international mediation practice by 
exploring its capabilities and infrastructure and thereby locating opportunities and constraints to it 
performance. By bringing together various perspectives these discussions generated critical insights into 
where the remaining gaps in knowledge lay and the possibilities of academic partnerships with 
practitioners and policymakers to create new knowledge for Security and Conflict Analysis Studies. 
 
Core Themes 
The discussions at this workshop focused primarily on: 
1. Mapping knowledge of EU mediation. 
2. Addressing the infrastructures that support mediation as a tool of EU foreign policy. 
3. Exploring perspectives from practitioners involved in EU mediation efforts. 












This workshop was the first of two intended to bring together a range of actors including academics, 
practitioners and policy officials working in the area of international mediation. This workshop introduced 
a new programme of study, as part of the School of Politics and International Relations’ Thematic 
Programmes, The European Union in Crisis Management: Mediation Capabilities. Whereas mediation 
plays an important role in international conflict analysis theory, it has found limited integration in the 
study of international politics. Moreover, and perhaps more pertinently, the role of new actors such as the 
European Union remains understudied. Taken together, the workshop’s conveners set out to provide a 
space for rigorous intellectual and practical discussions on how to understand the role of the EU as 
mediator in its context as a foreign policy actor. The workshop provided the opportunity for a diversity of 
perspectives on the EU’s roles in international peace support, especially through mediation.  
I. Mapping the Academic Literature on EU as Mediator  
These discussions have been motivated by the fact that there is no coherent body of work on EU 
mediation in the context of its role as foreign policy actor. Consequently, and as noted by one of the first 
speaker, it provides an exciting space for new studies.  
Nevertheless, one of the key issues that arose is that in the academic context where definitional rigour is 
often demanded, there is no consensus as to what mediation in the EU context is. 
One of the key issues that was first raised during the morning session and highlighted throughout the day 
is that the EU’s understanding of mediation is perhaps different from established academic definitions, 
norms and practices. In particular, mediation in the EU context potentially takes on new meaning given 
that its political role excludes neutrality, which has often been understood as essential to mediation 
practices. Thus, to understand the EU’s mediation capacity, it is essential to frame this within a broader 
context of the EU as a foreign policy actor. Through this lens mediation can then be seen as a policy 
instrument, within its crisis management toolkit. As one of three modes of engagement (including 
facilitation and dialogue) mediation is one of the EU’s most directly interventionist tools.  
Further, the EU’s conceptualisation of mediation is deliberately broad, precisely because this is a tool 
located in its foreign policy framework thus allowing for its deployment at any stage in the conflict cycle 
for the purposes of prevention or transformation. Yet, this has not been necessarily reflected in academic 
study. While practitioners tended to take a broad definition of activities performed by EU representatives 
(including officials and contractors) and other activities supported by the EU but performed by other 
organisations, academic discourse reflected a preference for a tighter focus wherein only activities 
performed on behalf of the Union by officials is applicable for assessment as constituted for EU mediation 
performance.  
In the morning sessions, we were reminded that in the EU’s case, analysis calls on us to examine the 
system of rules and procedures (of the EU as a foreign policy actor) which create opportunities and/or 
constraints for the EU’s activities in mediation.  
The current foreign policy architecture, within which the EU acts, as a mediator, is quite personalised. The 
system relies on heads of delegations and their deputies in specific countries, in addition to appointed EU 
Special Representatives (EUSRs). EUSR appointees have staying power and this allows for expert 
continuity of country teams’ engagement in a given conflict.  This is further evidence of how mediation 
performed on behalf of the EU is subject to and relies on interpersonal interactions. As acknowledged by 
one of the workshop’s presenters, scholars of mediation increasingly acknowledge the impact of 
mediation processes on international politics, but often fail to acknowledge its link with the processes and 
mechanics of it. In other words, these are deemed technical. However, the failure to fully acknowledge 
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the interpersonal relations, for example, constitutes a knowledge gap that is essential to understand the 
EU’s mediation impact. 
Additionally, within a system that sees the EU’s efforts of mediation within a foreign policy context, the 
normative framework of engagement must also be examined. This framework is articulated in the Treaty 
on the European Union, and it was the perspective of one of the participants that this could be potentially 
interpreted as the EU having a state-building agenda. In this context, state-building refers to the process 
of ‘constructing or reconstructing institutions of governance capable of providing citizens with physical 
and economic security’ (Chandler, 2006, p. 1). The normative framework therefore matters because it 
impacts on perceptions of the EU’s political and normative motivations as a mediator. In researching the 
EU, it is essential that the perception of local actors, those who are parties to mediation processes 
facilitated by the EU be taken into account. One of the key questions that thus emerge is how do we go 
about ensuring this? 
It was further noted that the potential comparative advantage of the EU as a political, economic, and 
development actor is the potential to work across hierarchies and different contexts. Because the EU 
embodies other foreign policy roles, its engagement as mediator often allows broader participation, which 
is embedded in the EU’s own normative perspectives. As one participant who has worked in both 
academic and practitioner settings noted, to understand mediation in conflict, it would benefit deeper 
understanding if mediation is understood as part of the broader ‘dataset’ of conflict interventions, as 
mediation is a process rather than a singular act. Importantly, mediation must be understood within the 
specific context of the conflict under consideration. By understanding the specific contexts, this gives 
voice to various and competing narratives, beyond the dominant ones proffered by elites and those that 
often overshadow the process might not be enough to lead to conflict transformation towards peace. 
Challenges were put to the workshop’s conveners, (for research on the possibilities of the EU’s added 
value) including a call for academic research to look beyond Anglo-American notions of mediation. In the 
first instance, these notions are limited to the narrow conceptualisations of mediation; but also, it 
invariably silences potential innovation, especially those that consider bringing local perspectives into 
mediation Discourse. 
II. EU Mediation Processes: A View from the Inside 
A. Infrastructure 
In the first part of the afternoon, the second session tackled the EU’s mediation infrastructure, drawing on 
perspectives of those who work within it and those working on understanding and improving its 
capabilities. 
From this insider perspective, mediation is confirmed as a tool to be used at all stages in conflict. The core 
mediation expertise of the EU lies within the European External Action Services (EEAS) further confirming 
that for the EU, mediation is viewed as part of its broader foreign policy instruments. The relevant unit 
within the EEAS is the Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding and Mediation Instruments Division (K2) which 
houses the Mediation Support Team. The core role of the unit is to support Delegations and those 
involved in actual mediation. The unit provides important services, such as technical guidance and experts 
to other colleagues that have political and diplomatic ‘know-how’.  
The Mediation Team highlights which countries to focus on and then the member states can inform the 
team of what is already being done. With this information, the EEAS mediation team can then decide 
further where coordinated effort should be placed. This process of negotiating the priority cases allows for 
a focus on potentially neglected areas of emerging conflict, and attempts to reduce the over 
politicisation/political wrangling over the choice of engagement and how this engagement is undertaken. 
The unit includes over 50 members of staff who work on the following capabilities: 
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The Early Warning System is supposed to help with determining which cases get picked for EU 
engagement. It is suggested that this process is systematic requiring surveys to be sent out to various 
parties at Brussels and member states’ levels.  It also relies on open-source information and is thus an 
intricate process of looking at certain countries and coming up with recommendations on about 15 
countries to the member states in the Political and Security Committee (PSC). 
Conflict Analysis – an important tool that is supportive of the comprehensive approach. It helps all EU 
parties address commonalities before engaging in conflict situations. 
Mediation support as part of EU Foreign Policy is driven by the EU’s desire to contribute to peacemaking 
externally based on what is seen as its own unique experience. There are various actors involved in this 
process, and beyond Brussels – importantly, it involves the EU Delegations all over the world as key 
participants in processes of mediation. 
Other activities include Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Partnerships.  
EU mediation despite its difference from traditional conceptions of mediation uses some of the same 
language framed within other diplomatic practices, e.g.  the system of diplomatic ‘Tracks’ or Military and 
civilian missions are sometimes deployed alongside one another, which in itself raises questions as to 
whether peace support in conflict is at risk of securitisation.  
For EU policymakers, funding provided by the EU for mediation efforts is considered a part of EU efforts 
even when there is no direct participation. This again reinforces an institutional narrative that is reiterated 
the key policy framework document Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities that 
sees mediation in a broad sense. Additionally, the EU often aims to deploy multiple tools alongside 
mediation efforts, one of which is dialogue. While distinct, mediation and dialogue are linked. The 
politicised nature of mediation however is seen as an advantage from the perspective of the EU. In other 
words, the EU does consider its prior engagement in conflict situations to be an asset in its efforts to 
mediate peace.  
Two Cases where the EU often used as examples of its best practices include Aceh and East Timor.The 
approach taken in East Timor is linked to the EU’s commitment to promoting regional integration. The 
view from within the EU is that the EU serves as a good model of regional integration, and ASEAN depends 
on this. However, the literature on ASEAN would suggest that while there is learning with regards to 
regional integration, the EU is not precisely a model that is replicable in the region, and thus, the EU’s 
potential strength is less in the modelling. Yet, it cannot be denied that the EU is a good case of regional 
peace building post WW II. 
The view from within the EU institutions is that there is a realistic expectation of what the EU can achieve 
during mediation. Indeed, perhaps contrary to what the literature suggests would be an ideal outcome of 
mediation; the achievement is often not a peace agreement.  Rather, the EU’s action can be preventive, or 
create the space for on-going dialogue to help break deadlocks. This is especially important in cases where 
on-going negotiations can help to identify possible solutions, even if no concrete agreement is reached. 
The EU thus works towards mediation activities that can help to bridge gaps in order to build confidence 
between parties. Mediation activities can provide externally sponsored guarantees that anything that 
comes out of the process will have some degree of success through implementation due to external 
accountability. Or potentially, a mediator can act as a guarantor towards an eventual peace. Mediation 
provides the safe spaces for debate, knowledge exchange, and can help with concrete suggestions or help 
in drafting particular agreements. 
Further, given the challenges of EU- led troop deployment in crisis management, mediation may also 
make a more useful contribution by the EU to addressing conflict based insecurities such as displacement, 
food insecurity, and gender based violence. Further it is less expensive than peacekeeping. To be clear, 
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although cheaper than peacekeeping, mediation is an expensive endeavour and someone still has to pay 
for it.  
But mediation is not without its own challenges and these can be viewed in two parts.  
B. Challenges 
The first set of challenges has to do with problems that arise from the conflict parties. The greater the 
discrepancy in resources and capacity between parties to conflict, the greater the likelihood of 
dependence on external mediators by one side or another. But resources are not finite, and as a result of 
time and resource pressures sometimes, conflicting parties are forced to sign something that they don’t 
believe in or they don’t understand and cannot truly implement.  Further, dependence on the resources 
put in by donors like the EU could lessen the incentive to move towards an agreement since continued 
mediation means more money from donors.  Then if the mediator leaves prematurely, there is the 
likelihood that the positive impact of mediation is limited. Further, given the reliance on interpersonal 
relationships and its importance for continuity and building trust, the individual mediator(s) role is very 
important. Often, the mediator is mostly dependent on the donors for continued employment in those 
cases where the EU or other international organisations contract out mediation support. Creating a 
narrative of necessity, mediators can often find ways of justifying their own relevance to keep going back 
to the communities of the parties to conflict within which they work. Criticality must therefore be 
maintained in researching EU mediation activities given that the work of mediators can be self-defeating 
and actually maintain the status quo thus causing more harm than good. 
The second set of challenges is to some extent linked with the above, but especially concerned with the 
process of mediation itself. It was suggested that sometimes mediators are not fully conversant in local 
cultural and political complexities, which undermines their ability to support a mediation process 
substantively. Their knowledge is sometimes superficial enough to lead to serious problems, which can 
make it difficult to know how and where the mediator fit in within the mediation process. Given the 
nature of mediation, which relies on personalised relationships, the mediator’s role can become over 
personalised where the mediator becomes more important than the process (establishing trust and 
dialogue) and the outcome.  
Academics and International Organisations (including third party representatives1) can be complicit in 
compounding these challenges, by going into conflict areas wanting to understand the situation through 
‘measurable’ established frameworks. It is important, therefore, to note that experts have their own 
agenda within the mediation process, which does not always echo what is needed within processes or 
local preferences.  There is a need for academic experts not to ’crowd’ the field and also maintain critical 
distance. There was a significant consensus around the room that often international ‘experts’ have the 
potential to overwhelm the conflicting parties with their ‘expertise’. The question remains however how 
can we gain more knowledge into these processes as academics while accounting for and respecting local 
preferences and avoiding an environment that becomes overwhelming for those who are vulnerable? 
Of course, there are constraints to how and within what contexts mediators can act. From the point of 
view of international organisations like the EU, whereas certain agendas have their basis in international 
legal norms (e.g. preserving territorial integrity, no amnesties for human rights violators), sometimes this 
is not appropriate at the pragmatic level. This of course raises questions of balance for the EU who is 
obliged to keep international legal norms and indeed sees itself as a norm shaper. 
One of the questions raised in the first session of the afternoon’s proceedings was how the EU identifies 
which conflicts it chooses to mediate. There is no scientific formula that has thus been deciphered. 
Rather, the K-2 unit is dependent on information from EU Special Representatives and their staff who are 
                                                          
1
 For example civil society organisations contracted to work on behalf of specific donors 
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already working with conflicting parties. One example of where this has happened is in the current case of 
Mali, where the local EU delegation played a role in shaping Brussels’ responses. Additionally, information 
that drives decision-making is informed by other regional organisations, with whom the EU works in every 
conflict it is involved. The positive examples of Aceh and East Timor were cited as good practice, and led 
the group to conclude that, in contrast to most other foreign policy areas, the EU performs its mediation 
function best in locations at distances well beyond its neighbourhood. There was the sense however that 
although counter intuitively to most other foreign policy areas which often prioritises the neighbourhood 
(loosely defined), the EU performs best when it is as far away from a case needing mediation as possible. 
So, in those cases where the perception is that the EU has no immediate stake in the conflict and its 
outcome, it fared better as a mediator. In those instances where the EU cannot be viewed as a ‘neutral’ 
actor, it is still involved in funding peacebuilding activities, as in the Georgian/Abkhaz context. In the 
Philippines, for example, the EU funds civil society organisations as part of mediation support 
mechanisms. The closer a case is to EU borders the bigger the interests of EU member states, which 
complicates its role as mediator.  
On Syria, the divisions in views of EU member states have made it difficult for the EU to be more engaged. 
Conflicting or competing interests among member states at Brussels level, particularly amongst those who 
are also UN Security Council members, have inhibited a more active role for the EU in Syria.   Beyond the 
EU institutions, the actors within the EU driving the decision to contribute to mediation often include the 
Nordic countries, Belgium, Netherlands and Spain. Civil society organisations (CSOs) play a significant role 
in encouraging EU engagement in mediation and the EU tends to work with existing patterns. 
While mediation is applicable to all cycles of conflict, it is often linked to instances where there is already 
evidence of crisis. However, one EU insider gives one example of using mediation at the conflict 
prevention level through engagement with election processes. In this sense, elections are seen as 
potential conflict triggers and one of the countries the EU is currently working with is Togo (West Africa). 
It is nevertheless important to consider that there is a lot going on within mediation that is unplanned that 
is sometimes beneficial and other times not. The key then is trying to ascertain when mediation can be 
most useful. 
One of the EU’s advantages over some other international mediators is the ability to conduct both 
mediation and dialogue. Whereas mediation tends to want an end result such as an agreement, dialogue 
is more open ended, and creates the space for continued negotiations. One of the issues raised is how 
these two processes relate to each other – are they mutually reinforcing, or does one set the stage for the 
other? 
But the EEAS unit is faced with challenges too. It would be useful, for instance, to have the capabilities to 
go beyond the member states so that it can autonomously deploy mediation capacity especially since the 
framework of the Lisbon Treaty encourages this. However, this will only happen if the current High 
Representative develops a strong presence and is more ‘daring’ because the member states often claim 
this area of high politics for themselves. 
III. Civil Society Perspectives on EU Mediation Activities 
In the final part of the main programme, the space was given to civil society organisations’ perspectives 
on EU contributions to international mediation, but also to ascertain the utility of the EU in crisis 
management through the use of mediation. The civil society representatives all had experiences of having 
worked with or on behalf of the EU in mediation. Mediation from this perspective is something that the 
EU has been engaged in for a while despite the limited literature or knowledge of its activities.  
There exists one instance of desktop based research conducted by a policy think tank, which examines 
official policy documents to map out what the EU is doing and is the first attempt to start getting to the 
challenge of examining the EU’s nascent role in international mediation. Additionally, limited but 
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unattributed interviews with EU officials have the potential to yield other substantive information; 
however, respondents often consider the subject matter sensitive and are reluctant to speak about it. This 
raises two challenges. First, how can we as researchers deal with the ethical dilemmas of not being able to 
attribute or corroborate information due to the perceived sensitivities? Second, and perhaps even more 
importantly, how do we get the information in the first instance? One suggestion was to examine 
historical cases and speak with people who have left the institution.  
In the first attempt to probe relevant officials about EU’s mediation practices, there was the sense (prior 
to the formation of a dedicated EEAS section on Mediation) that officials felt that the EU did not ‘do 
mediation’. The inquiry found that there are sections of the EU who are not aware of what mediation 
entails despite the range of work that the EU does in this area. The EU Concept itself is not widely known 
despite the existence of the K2 unit. Further research on mediation thus has the potential to increase the 
visibility of this sort of work even within the EU. 
Drawing on experiences of interacting with EU actors, there was the sense that the EU had intimate 
knowledge of a particular conflict’s dynamics, both the perspectives of those on the ground and of policy 
elites; the EU is able to contribute more substantively to international mediation. The knowledge often 
comes from the members of EU delegations and representatives (including well informed geographical 
desks) in the country or region. These people knew how mediation worked and fed the EU the relevant 
information needed for engagement. So the role of individuals was essential.  
A member of civil society echoed the inhibiting role that EU actors such as member states play in engaging 
in mediation activities. One of the lessons drawn out from the limited study of EU mediation is the need to 
actively manage the EU’s own family: the EUSRs and the member states. Even EU officials are aware of the 
sometimes tense and counter productive relationships within the EU family. Yet, in order for EU mediation 
to work, member states’ backing is needed.  
While the academic and policy literatures are often insistent that EU foreign policy needs coherence and 
the ability to speak with one voice is viewed as the tangible expression of this, it seems an unachievable 
dream. Consensus therefore cannot be the criteria for the EU to engage in mediation activities, even when 
the backing of key actors within the Union is needed. What is needed is that at ‘critical junctures’ there 
needs to be one voice coming from the EU, rather than getting all the member states to agree on every 
issue. 
Partnership is key. It is very rare to find the EU doing mediation and dialogue on its own. Success and 
failures are heavily reliant on a wide range of partnerships. In examples such as Aceh, Kenya, Kosovo, 
Serbia, these were areas where the EU had partners including the UN, international NGOs, regional 
organisations and the US. Another example is in the Caucasus where there is no formal peace process, but 
where the EU nevertheless is supporting the space for dialogue through the European Partnership for the 
Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (EPNK), which is an initiative of international 
NGOs funded by the EU.  
There is a need to have smart political relationships. The EU is often seen as a ‘giant’ cash machine - the 
go-to for resources. Yet, where the EU worked better was where it had existing relationship, but not 
necessarily a subordinated one. A relationship beyond the financial relationship is often the one where 
the EU does best in terms of its contributions to mediation and dialogue.  
There is a need to move from ad hoc responses to international best practices. While the EU has always 
had many approaches to ‘mediating’ conflict, often these were not situated within broader concerns of 
conflict management or peace support operations. And this is an area where taking forward a research 
agenda on EU mediation can contribute. The perspective from civil society is that it is useful to see 
mediation as part of the broader peace-building effort, and for mediation to be successful the framework 
must go beyond the negotiating table to support efforts to build sustainable peace. This suggests a rethink 
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of how we conceptualise mediation. But also importantly, the EU’s broad concept of mediation, 
encompassing mediation, dialogue and facilitation makes it a key mediation actor in this regard – 
facilitating support to broad-based peace processes, as well as more elite negotiations. 
IV. Avenues of Research to Explore 
These discussions confirmed that there was a gap in the academic literature concerning EU roles in 
international mediation. The existing limited research has been mostly conducted by policy think tanks on 
an ad hoc basis despite the wealth of knowledge on practice. In the next stage of this research agenda, we 
are keen to explore first what academics can contribute to the debate by engaging more directly with the 
policymakers and other partners. 
In setting a future research agenda, the research team is asked to consider that headlines in media and 
research about mediation are often associated with the ‘Big Man’ or Prestige Mediator. Yet, the areas 
where those on the ground suggest the EU has made a difference are often smaller in scale in terms their 
contributions to change. This dimension of where mediation takes place could potentially be an area of 
research to explore. For example, focusing on the supply-demand side of mediation by trying to 
understand the ‘whys’ and ‘hows’ that goes into the EU’s decision-making on whether to mediate or not 
mediate. Along these lines, the temporal dimensions of mediation as it affects sequencing would be a 
useful empirical contribution to the field. Understanding the sequencing of activities could potentially help 
to elaborate on where the EU is most needed. Further, it would be useful to understand how the EU fares 
in comparison to other actors. Of course, it is often difficult to separate out the EU-effect from those of 
other actors; nevertheless, there is an opportunity to explore the workings of the EU as it develops into an 
established actor in the field of international mediation. 
A broad definition of mediation may be useful in framing the research agenda, which takes as its starting 
point EU Foreign Policy. While the Concept document provides a definitional frame of what constitutes 
mediation, it may still be useful to conduct research intended to understand how certain practices of the 
EU are enacted as mediation, while others are excluded from this frame. Undertaking this type of research 
may be necessary in order to truly engage in transforming conflict towards peace. Whereas to date, the 
EU is not often in the lead with regards to mediation, the EU does have a role to play and thus a research 
agenda with the EU as its focus has the potentially to significantly contribute theoretically and 
methodologically to existing explorations of international mediation in conflict analysis studies.  
Critical approaches to mediation should examine questions around ‘who is the mediator’ – thus 
considering both those in the spotlight working on macro-level issues and those who interact with local 
actors at the micro-level. The importance of local perspectives cannot be understated and EU must 
consider this a priority when choosing mediators for EU sanctioned roles in mediation. Here, the role of 
the EUSRs is very important.  
Tentatively, we would also like to explore questions we consider pertinent to gaining a full up to date and 
systematic picture of EU mediation activities. These questions fall within four main themes: 
a. The institutional architecture of EU mediation, including capabilities and transparency 
b. The manner in which power is located in mediation knowledge, processes and practices 
c. The ethics of undertaking a sensitive research agenda 
d. Sources of holistic data of EU mediation endeavours 
Crafting research questions and an agenda based on these themes will not be without its challenges. For 
example, we need to address the methodological challenges posed by researching macro-level mediation 
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activities and micro-level activities. Furthermore, methodological challenges inevitably arise from studying 
mediation as an instrument of security (and therefore through International Relations lenses) or an 
instrument of peace (through Peace Studies/Conflict analysis lenses). However, finding a way to address 
at least some of the questions posed at this workshop, we believe, can contribute not only new 
knowledge but enable lasting peace. 
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